INTERVIEW — Putin and Ukraine: The Never-Ending Story

By Reuvain Borchardt

John Hardie, deputy director of the Russia Program at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, discusses the Ukraine War.

Hardie’s research focuses on Russian foreign and security policy, U.S. policy toward Russia and the post-Soviet space, and transatlantic relations. 

He holds an M.A. in security studies from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and completed his undergraduate education bachelor’s degrees in international relations, political science, and psychology from the University of Georgia.

Putin clearly didn’t expect the war to be nearly as tough as it’s been — though Russia has had some more successes lately, as Ukraine hasn’t been able to repel Russian advances as it did earlier on. 

Of course, Putin would have loved to swallow the entire Ukraine. But what were his realistic expectations at the outset of the war?

I think Putin looked at the Ukraine War in terms of a broader set of grievances against the West, going back to the end of the Cold War era, and his belief that the West has wronged Russia and denied it its rightful place in the European security order. And those grievances are most acute with regard to Ukraine. Putin has long seen Ukraine as not even a real country, but a territory that rightfully belongs to Russia that Russia needs to have to be the great power that he wants for his own legacy. 

After 2014-2015, when he tried these things called the Minsk Agreements, basically a diplomatic way to get what he wanted in Ukraine — a veto on Ukraine’s major foreign policy decisions and assurance that Russia would have major influence in Ukraine — he got fed up with those agreements, because they weren’t really working. Kyiv didn’t want to implement certain parts of them — for good reason, because they essentially stripped Kyiv of sovereignty — so Putin eventually decided to settle this, once and for all, by force.

He was expecting Ukraine would just kind of roll over; after all, that is sort of what happened when Russia invaded Crimea in 2014 — there was no resistance. That experience probably heavily informed what he was expecting, along with his broader, bigoted view of Ukraine as not being a real country and as deserving of subjugation by Russia. He even probably believed that many Ukrainians would welcome Russian troops. Obviously, that didn’t happen. 

The initial Russian invasion operation was designed to decapitate the government in Kyiv and install a puppet regime. He thought that would be easy. The Russian military’s plan was predicated on minimal resistance. Obviously, it didn’t work out that way. 

At this point, what do you think Putin really wants? Does he still have the same goals that he had in the beginning of overrunning Ukraine? Or is he just looking for some sort of honorable exit where he can get a few regions, save face and claim victory, but get out?

I think his grand objective — the subjugation of Ukraine — remains unchanged and won’t ever change. His minimal war aim is probably to take the rest of the Donbas region — the part of eastern Ukraine where Russia has been at war with Ukraine since 2014.

If Russia were to achieve that, maybe Putin would agree to a ceasefire — but it wouldn’t be the end of the Ukraine project for Putin. That’s important to understand. If and when this war does end, it may well not be the last thing said on the issue.

Putin would probably see this as inconclusive and want one more bite at the apple, so there’s a good chance there’ll be follow-on war.  

So taking the rest of the Donbas is the minimal war aim. So long as the U.S. and others continue to provide aid, I don’t think Russia will get there. Russia will have to make a choice about whether it wants to keep this going indefinitely or settle for a ceasefire, and maybe try again later.

So you believe Putin might now accept a negotiated ceasefire that gives him the Donbas? And what terms do you think Zelensky might accept?

I don’t really see either party as genuinely interested in a ceasefire at this point. Both make these public overtures. Zelensky has his peace plan, which is unacceptable to Russia. Russia has put forward terms that would be unacceptable to Kyiv — namely, that Kyiv would accept Russian annexation of the five regions of Ukraine that it controls. Kyiv has rejected that out of hand, and I don’t think that’ll change. Neither side is focused on peace talks right now; they’re still focused on the war effort. Maybe that could change down the road. 

For Ukraine — and G-d willing this won’t happen — if they find themselves in a position where their aid is melting away and the battlefield situation is getting worse, maybe that’s when they might change their tune. 

For Russia, if we’re able to help Ukraine withstand this tough year and go into 2025 regaining the advantage — maybe retake some more territory, or at least put Russia on its back foot at a time when Moscow has to worry about its own mounting challenges sustaining the war, in terms of how much equipment they’ve already taken out of stores and how much they have left, its reliance on foreign ammunition supplies that may or may not continue, etc. — maybe Putin gets to a point where he says, “Okay, I’m not going to get any more territory. I’m better off just pausing now before things get worse.”

Dissent is not tolerated in Russia, so we can’t know for certain how the population feels. But what do you believe is the popularity level in Russia for this war? 

I think there’s a minority of the population that supports it, there’s a minority that is really against it, and then there’s a majority in the middle that is just sort of apathetic. Maybe they are kind of sympathetic to the view that Russia should be the dominant force in Ukraine and Eastern Europe, but they really care most about their quality of life, and they don’t really want to be bothered with this sort of thing. 

The Kremlin has cultivated this sort of apathy for much of Putin’s tenure. Obviously, the Kremlin would like to have support, but apathy is the next best thing; if they can keep that, they’re fine. 

Congress is still fighting over the $60-billion Ukraine aid bill. How important for Ukraine is that aid? Would it allow Ukraine to have the successes in repelling Russia that it had earlier on? Or do you think Ukraine is in serious manpower trouble even if it gets this aid?

The aid bill is absolutely vital. 

But with or without the aid, I think Ukraine is looking at a defensive strategy for 2024. At least that would be the smart thing to do. Regardless of whether Congress passes the aid, Ukraine is going to be at a disadvantage in terms of shells, which really precludes any sort of major offensive operation. So the smart thing to do is dig in and defend, which Ukrainians are trying to do now, and to absorb Russia’s offensives and sap Russia’s offensive potential. Then, in 2025, after you’ve used this year to put the pieces in place in terms of things like increasing shell production capacity and improving training for Ukrainian troops, Ukraine could go back on the offensive. But it requires Congress doing its job this year and next year, and it requires the United States and Ukraine and their other partners to be forward-thinking and proactive in putting those pieces in place.

Historically, Republicans were viewed as having a more interventionist foreign policy, and Democrats, more isolationist or pacifist or anti-war or however you want to phrase it. But that has not been the case in the Ukraine War. Democrats appear to be all in on helping Ukraine, while a sizable share of Republicans don’t share that enthusiasm. Why do you think this is so? Is it the influence of Trump and his “America First” views? Or is it because the current president happens to be a Democrat, so whatever he wants to do, like give aid to Ukraine, the other party, in this case the Republicans, will oppose it? 

It’s a great question. I’m not really an expert in domestic politics, but I can say I believe a majority of the country, and definitely a majority of the Congress, supports Ukraine aid, including a large percentage of the Republican Congress members and senators. As long as we can get the Ukraine aid bill to the House floor, it’ll pass.

The question is whether Speaker Johnson will allow it to come to the floor for a vote. I’m not sure what the route is going to be to get it there, whether it’s a so-called discharge petition or Johnson actually putting it on the floor himself. But once it’s there, it’ll pass, no doubt.

There’s also been this whole back-and-forth among Republicans about whether to tie the Ukraine aid bill to a border security bill. First the Republicans said they wanted them tied, then they opposed a bill that had both Ukraine funding and border provisions. Why do you feel Republicans initially insisted on tying Ukraine funding to border security? Is it because they really oppose the Ukraine aid and don’t want it to pass? Or is it because they really want the border security bill to pass and figured that could never pass it as a standalone, so they decided to tie it to Ukraine aid which they figured would pass?

The border is a top issue for most Republicans. And certainly, it’s a major issue on Trump’s campaign trail. If we’re being honest, that’s probably why he had congressional Republicans sink the bill that had both Ukraine and border-security funding — because it would have blunted one of his big issues on the campaign trail.

In my opinion, it was always wrongheaded to tie those two issues together. Ukraine aid is worthwhile on its merits. Securing our borders is worthwhile on its merits. And trying to tie one to the other isn’t really smart. That being said, once we had that deal with both issues, I do wish we had just allowed it to go forward. The compromise border-security measures seemed sensible to me, and the situation with Ukraine aid is increasingly dire. So I do hope that the House Republicans and Trump will stop being obstructionist and start being more constructive. 

French President Emmanuel Macron recently caused a stir when he said we can’t rule out having Western nations send troops to Ukraine. France immediately had its foreign minister walk those comments back, saying Macron was referring to things like cyberdefense, weapons production, and mine clearing.

Do you believe it’s possible at any point, whether sooner or later, if the situation is really dire and Ukraine simply doesn’t have sufficient manpower, that NATO countries might send troops to Ukraine? Or is that a line that simply will not be crossed regardless of the situation? 

We’re not going to fight Russia in Ukraine. 

Macron says a lot of things. Some of it is helpful and some of it isn’t. I don’t think he was talking about fighting Russia, I think he was talking about a demining mission or something like that. 

It’s also worth mentioning that the United States and other countries have had a very small number of special operations forces on the ground in Ukraine — not fighting Russia, but just working in the rear, facilitating logistics and other things.

But to answer your question, no, the West is not going to fight Russia in Ukraine.

Even if it looked like Russia might completely overtake Ukraine?

I don’t see the United States and NATO directly fighting Russia in Ukraine, no. 

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rborchardt@hamodia.com

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This interview originally appeared in Hamodia Prime magazine.