ANALYSIS: The Faltering Reconciliation

On Hoshana Rabbah, thousands of Jews departed the Kosel as they wished each other “pitka tava.” As they made their way through the alleyways of the Old City, they could not help but notice crowds of Palestinians dancing and celebrating.

When asked what it was all about, they were told that only minutes before, Fatah and Hamas signed a reconciliation agreement in Cairo.

“Peace among brothers has been restored,” an elderly Palestinian declared at the entrance of his shop, and said that this marked an historical turning point.

But is it really so? At the time the news broke, no one in the Palestinian street knew what the deal contained. In the ten days that have passed since then, however, most of the details have emerged, and the enthusiasm of the Palestinians has quieted down.

“This is not exactly what we expected,” say the commentators in the Palestinian media.

Five reconciliations quite similar to this one were signed in Cairo in the past several years, and not one led to the hoped-for peace. Why should this one be any more encouraging?

In fact, a close examination of the new agreement shows that it does not contain anything that the earlier ones lacked, but were not implemented. Furthermore, the signatories took the text that was signed five years ago and copied it, adding only that they hope this time its provisions will be fulfilled.

In Yerushalayim, Washington, Cairo and Ramallah, all are skeptical. The only item that was given any deadline was that of the transfer of civil administration in Gaza to the Palestinian Authority of Mahmoud Abbas and the lifting of PA financial sanctions on Gaza. The others were left open, even though they related to issues which caused the failure of previous agreements.

For example, Mahmoud Abbas insists that the Hamas military wing must come under the control of Fatah, the main faction in the PA, while Hamas absolutely refuses. Fatah seeks general elections in the near term, while Hamas remains opposed. And so on. The unresolved issues were deferred to committees for further discussion.

Behind the agreement stand the Egyptians. And behind the Egyptians, the Americans. Because the Trump administration has come to understand that there cannot be hope of meaningful peace talks until or unless the Palestinians can present a united front.

On the Israeli side, after two days of discussion in the cabinet, the government came to the conclusion that there was little prospect that the agreement would be implemented. However, there was a danger that the PA would take over civil administration in Gaza, leaving Hamas to do as it pleases militarily, while the world had the impression that the Palestinians had resolved their differences. Israel would then be expected to enter into negotiations with an entity still committed to terror and the destruction of Israel, a prospect that Israel could not entertain. Thus, the cabinet decided to publish its rejection of the reconciliation as long as Hamas remained armed and refused to recognize Israel’s right to exist.

The reconciliation text says nothing about Hamas operations in Yehudah and Shomron, but presumably they expect Fatah to allow them more latitude for their terror infrastructure and attacks. In the meantime, though, they continue to arrest and thwart Hamas operatives in the region.

Another problem: The reconciliation agreement does not obligate the PA to lift sanctions on Gaza. Abbas has stated that the sanctions will remain in place until the PA has control of the border crossings, security forces and government offices. Hamas officials have already complained that this position is not consistent with “the spirit of reconciliation.”

The Egyptians prided themselves on their key role in bringing the Palestinian negotiations to a conclusion. They used every psychological tool available to bring it about. For example, once they understood that the talked-about return of Abbas rival Mahmoud Dahlan was a red flag for Abbas, they mounted a publicity campaign heralding his return, and then elicited Abbas’s cooperation in the reconciliation agreement with the promise that Egypt would keep Dahlan away.

Mahmoud Abbas is well-satisfied with the deal. Especially the part which gives him control over the government in Gaza. That, and the promise of gaining control over the 20,000 strong Hamas militia. And until he actually has control of the Hamas military wing, the whole deal could fall apart.

Hamas entered the agreement out of weakness. The sanctions imposed by Israel and the Palestinian Authority over the past three years have weighed heavily on the population of Gaza, and the people there are not willing to take it any more. As a result, following a change of leadership in Hamas, there was a willingness to ‘reconcile” with Fatah under the aegis of the Egyptians, in order to relieve the economic pressure.

Word that President Donald Trump wanted a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and conditioned it on a reconciliation agreement, also had an impact.

In the final analysis, three issues remain to be resolved: The issue of the Hamas military wing, first of all. Hamas has proposed a solution on the Lebanon model, in which a unified civil government stands alongside the Hezbollah military. The same for Gaza. But there is opposition to such an arrangement, and so the matter remains for discussion.

Secondly, the question of a Hamas-Fatah coalition. Hamas might be eager for it, hoping that it would be able to take over the entire Palestinian leadership from the inside. In Fatah, they are not fools, and so are not keen on such a proposal.

Thirdly, the matter of parliamentary and presidential elections. Both sides claim they are in favor of free, democratic elections. Yet, both sides seek the electoral method that will be most likely to enable their side to win. In the meantime: stalemate.

Meanwhile, it is best that Israel refrains from any active opposition to the reconciliation agreement, and says it will cooperate with the Americans and Egyptians and the PA.

It is preferable to have a Palestinian unity government, one that offers some hope, however small, of a movement toward peace. Also, the Lebanese model mentioned above would be an improvement on the current situation, because it would represent Gaza, moderate Hamas military operations, and allow the Palestinian Authority to conduct negotiations with Israel.